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here has been a long and voluminous litera-
ture about official intervention in foreign
exchange markets. Official intervention is
generally defined as those foreign exchange trans-
actions of monetary authorities that are designed
to influence exchange rates, but can more broadly
refer to other policies for that purpose. Many papers
have explored the determinants and efficacy of
intervention (Edison, 1993; Sarno and Taylor, 2000)
but very little attention has been paid to the more
pedestrian subject of the mechanics of foreign
exchange intervention like choice of markets, types
of counterparties, timing of intervention during
the day, purpose of secrecy, etc. This article focuses
on the latter topics by reviewing the motivation
for, methods, and mechanics of intervention.
Although there apparently has been a decline in
the frequency of intervention by the major central
banks, reports of a coordinated G-7 intervention to
support the euro on September 22, 2000, remind
us that intervention remains an active policy instru-
ment in some circumstances.
The second section of the article reviews foreign
exchange intervention and describes several meth-
ods by which it can be conducted. The third section
presents evidence from 22 responses to a survey on
intervention practices sent to monetary authorities. 
TYPES OF INTERVENTION
Intervention and the Monetary Base
Studies of foreign exchange intervention gen-
erally distinguish between intervention that does
or does not change the monetary base. The former
type is called unsterilized intervention while the
latter is referred to as sterilized intervention. When
a monetary authority buys (sells) foreign exchange,
its own monetary base increases (decreases) by the
amount of the purchase (sale). By itself, this type
of transaction would influence exchange rates in
the same way as domestic open market purchases
(sales) of domestic securities; however, many cen-
tral banks routinely sterilize foreign exchange
operations—that is, they reverse the effect of the
foreign exchange operation on the domestic mon-
etary base by buying and selling domestic bonds
(Edison, 1993). The crucial distinction between
sterilized and unsterilized intervention is that the
former constitutes a potentially useful indepen-
dent policy tool while the latter is simply another
way of conducting monetary policy. 
For example, on June 17, 1998, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York bought $833 million
worth of yen (JPY) at the direction of the U.S.
Treasury and the Federal Open Market Committee.
In the absence of offsetting transactions, this
transaction would have increased the U.S. mone-
tary base by $833 million, which would tend to
temporarily lower interest rates and ultimately
raise U.S. prices, depressing the value of the dol-
lar.1 As is customary with U.S. intervention, how-
ever, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York also
sold an appropriate amount of U.S. Treasury
securities to absorb the liquidity and maintain
desired conditions in the interbank loan market.
Similarly, to prevent any change in Japanese
money market conditions, the Bank of Japan
would also conduct appropriate transactions to
offset the rise in demand for Japanese securities
caused by the $833 million Federal Reserve pur-
chase. The net effect of these transactions would
be to increase the relative supply of U.S. govern-
ment securities versus Japanese securities held by
the public but to leave the U.S. and Japanese
money supplies unchanged. 
Fully sterilized intervention does not directly
affect prices or interest rates and so does not influ-
ence the exchange rate through these variables as
ordinary monetary policy does. Rather, sterilized
intervention might affect the foreign exchange
market through two routes: the portfolio balance
channel and the signaling channel. The portfolio
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balance channel theory holds that sterilized pur-
chases of yen raise the dollar price of yen because
investors must be compensated with a higher ex-
pected return to hold the relatively more numerous
U.S. bonds. To produce a higher expected return,
the yen price of the U.S. bonds must fall immedi-
ately. That is, the dollar price of yen must rise. In
contrast, the signaling channel theory assumes
that official intervention communicates informa-
tion about future monetary policy or the long-run
equilibrium value of the exchange rate. 
Spot and Forward Markets for
Intervention
The previous example implicitly assumed that
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York conducted
its purchase of yen in the spot market—the mar-
ket for delivery in two days or less. Intervention
need not be carried out in the spot market, how-
ever; it also may be carried out in the forward
market.2 Forward markets are those in which
currencies are sold for delivery in more than two
days. Because the forward price is linked to the
spot price through covered interest parity, inter-
vention in the forward market can influence the
spot exchange rate.
To understand covered interest parity, con-
sider the options open to an American bank that
has capital to be invested for one year. The bank
could lend that money at the interest rate on U.S.
dollar assets, earning the gross return of (1+it
USD)
on each dollar. Or, it could convert its funds to a
foreign currency (e.g., the euro), lend that sum in
the overnight euro money market at the euro
interest rate, and then convert the proceeds back
to dollars at the end of the year. If, at the begin-
ning of the contract, the bank contracts to convert
the euro proceeds back to dollars, it will receive
1/Ft,t+365 dollars for each euro, where Ft,t+365 is
the euros-per-dollar forward exchange rate. The
gross return to each dollar through this second
strategy is
,
where St is the euros-per-dollar spot exchange rate
on day t. If the return to one strategy is higher
than the other, market participants will invest in
that strategy, driving its return down and the other











equal return. Covered interest parity (CIP) is the
condition that the strategies have equal return:
(1)
As equation (1) must approximately hold all
the time, intervention that changes the forward
exchange rate must also change the spot exchange
rate.3 For example, a forward purchase of euros
that raises Ft,t+365 must also raise St.
Forward market interventions—the purchase
or sale of foreign exchange for delivery at a future
date—have the advantage that they do not require
immediate cash outlay. If a central bank expects
that the need for intervention will be short-lived
and will be reversed, then a forward market inter-
vention may be conducted discreetly, with no
effect on foreign exchange reserves data. For ex-
ample, published reports indicate that the Bank of
Thailand used forward market purchases to shore
up the baht in the spring of 1997 (Moreno, 1997).4
Both the spot and forward markets may be
used simultaneously. A transaction in which a
currency is bought in the spot market and simul-
taneously sold in the forward market is known as
a currency swap. While a swap itself will have lit-
tle effect on the exchange rate, it can be used as
part of an intervention. The Reserve Bank of
Australia (RBA) used the swaps market to sterilize
spot interventions. In these transactions, the spot
leg of the swap is conducted in the opposite direc-
tion to the spot market intervention, leaving the
sequence equivalent to a forward market interven-
tion. The RBA uses the spot/swap combination
rather than an outright forward transaction
because the former permits more flexible imple-
mentation of the intervention.
11
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2 Exchange rate markets and practices are described in detail in the
Bank for International Settlements Central Bank Survey of Foreign
Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity (1999).
3 Of course, equation (1) could continue to hold with a change in
it
USD or it
euro instead of Ft,t+365, but the interest rates are held fixed
by conditions in the U.S. and euro money markets, respectively. 
4 Not all spot or forward market transactions are interventions, of
course. For example, to limit the costs of capital controls that made
it hard to hedge foreign exchange exposure, the Reserve Bank of
South Africa (RBSA) used to provide forward cover for firms with
foreign currency exposure. That is, it would buy dollars forward
from foreign firms with dollar accounts receivable and sell dollars
to foreign firms with dollar accounts payable in the future. As capi-
tal controls have been reduced, the RBSA has reduced its net open
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The Options Market and Intervention
The options market has also been used by
central banks for intervention. A European-style
call (put) option confers the right, but not the obli-
gation, to purchase (sell) a given quantity of the
underlying asset on a given date. Usually, the
option contract specifies the price for which the
asset may be bought or sold, called the strike or
exercise price.
Monetary authorities seeking to prevent depre-
ciation or devaluation of their currency may sell
put options on the domestic currency or call
options on the foreign currency.5 While the price
of options has no direct effect on spot exchange
rates, speculators often purchase put options
instead of shorting a weak currency. The writers
(sellers) of these put options attempt to hedge
their position by taking a long position in the
weak currency, adding to the downward pressure
on its price. By writing put options on the weak
currency—adding liquidity to the options mar-
ket—the central bank provides dealers with a syn-
thetic hedge; dealers need not go into the spot
market to take short positions in the weak curren-
cy. This arrangement creates the same type of
financial risk for the central bank—if the currency
is devalued—as would the direct purchase of the
weak currency in spot or forward markets. Like
forward market intervention, it does not, however,
require the monetary authority to immediately
expend foreign exchange reserves. In fact, the
strategy generates revenues upon the sales of the
options. The Bank of Spain reportedly used this
strategy of selling put options on the peseta to
fight devaluation pressures during 1993 (The
Economist, 1993), though the institution denied it
emphatically (The Financial Times, 1993).
In another intervention strategy using options,
the Banco de Mexico has employed sales of put
options on the U.S. dollar to accumulate foreign
exchange reserves since August 1, 1996 (Galan
Medina, Duclaud Gonzalez de Castillo, Garcia
Tames, 1997). The put options give the bearer the
right to sell dollars to the Banco de Mexico at a
strike price determined by the previous day’s
exchange rate, called the fix exchange rate. The
option may be exercised only if the peso has
appreciated over the last month, if the fix peso
price of dollars is no higher than a 20-day moving
average of previous strike prices. This restriction is
designed to prevent the Banco de Mexico from
having to buy dollars (sell pesos) during a period
of peso depreciation.
The sales of these put options may be consid-
ered foreign exchange intervention because they are
designed to prevent the necessity of intervention to
purchase dollar reserves that might affect the ex-
change rate in undesirable ways. Because the mech-
anism is totally passive—the public decides when to
exercise the options—the use of these options effec-
tively lessens the signaling impact of Banco de Mex-
ico purchases of foreign exchange reserves.
Indirect Intervention
Recall that although official intervention is
generally defined as foreign exchange transac-
tions of monetary authorities that are designed to
influence exchange rates, it can also refer to other
(indirect) policies for that purpose. In addition to
direct transactions in various instruments, Taylor
(1982a, b) recounts a number of methods by which
countries intervene indirectly in foreign exchange
markets. For example, he reports that in the 1970s
governments manipulated the currency portfolio
of nationalized industries in France, Italy, Spain,
and the United Kingdom to influence exchange
rates. This practice was allegedly used to “disguise”
intervention, as was the French and Italian prac-
tice of transacting through undisclosed foreign
exchange accounts held at commercial banks.
There are innumerable methods of indirectly
influencing the exchange rate that do not fit in
the narrow definition of intervention as foreign
exchange transactions of monetary authorities
designed to influence exchange rates. These meth-
ods involve capital controls—taxes or restrictions
on international transactions in assets like stocks
or bonds—or exchange controls—the restriction of
trade in currencies (Dooley, Mathieson, and Rojas-
Suarez, 1993; Neely, 1999), rather than transactions.
Sometimes such methods are substituted for more
direct foreign exchange intervention, especially by
the monetary authorities of countries without a
long history of free capital movements. For example,
Spain, Ireland, and Portugal introduced capital
controls—including mandatory deposits against
the holding of foreign currencies—in the exchange
rate mechanism (ERM) crises of 1992-93, in re-
sponse to speculation against their currencies.
5 Blejer and Schumacher (2000) discuss the implications of the use of
derivatives for central banks’ balance sheets.4 MAY/JUNE 2001
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SURVEY RESULTS 
To investigate the practice of foreign exchange
intervention, questionnaires on the topic were sent
to the 43 institutions that participated in the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS) (1999) survey of
foreign exchange practices and the European Cen-
tral Bank. Of those 44 authorities, 22 responded to
some or all of the questions asked. Table 1 lists the
surveyed authorities who responded. A cover letter
explained that the survey covered practices over
1990-2000, so that authorities that no longer inter-
vene—or even no longer have independent curren-
cies—could report on past practices. The Reserve
Bank of New Zealand was the only authority to re-
port that it had not intervened in the last 10 years.6
To respect the confidentiality of the respondents,
the responses of specific institutions will not be
identified unless the information is clearly in the
public domain. Table 2 shows statistics summariz-
ing the distribution of the responses to survey
questions on the mechanics of, motivation for, and
the efficacy of intervention. 
The Mechanics of Intervention
Question 1 inquires about the frequency of
intervention. Of the 14 authorities that responded
to the question, the percentage of business days
on which they report intervening—using either
sterilized or unsterilized transactions—ranged
from 0.5 percent to 40 percent, with 4.5 percent
being the median. While there might be some
selection bias because authorities that intervene
are more likely to respond to the survey, it does
appear that official intervention is reasonably
common in foreign exchange markets. 
In responding to question 2, 30 percent of au-
thorities report that all their foreign exchange
transactions change the monetary base, 30 percent
that such dealings sometimes change the base, and
40 percent that they never change the base. For
some issues, such as motivation or time horizon of
effectiveness, this conflation of responses about
sterilized and unsterilized intervention is poten-
tially unfortunate. 
When monetary authorities do intervene
(question 3), they seem to have some preference
for dealing with major domestic banks but will also
transact with major foreign banks. This should not
come as a complete surprise as banks tend to spe-
cialize in trading their own national currencies
(Melvin, 1997). Approximately half of authorities
will sometimes conduct business with other enti-
ties, such as other central banks (23.5 percent) or
investment banks (25 percent); 6.3 percent will al-
ways transact with investment banks. 
Intervention transactions over the last decade
have almost always been conducted at least par-
tially in spot markets according to the answers to
question 4: 95.2 percent of authorities report that
their official intervention activities always include
spot market transactions and another 4.8 percent
sometimes include spot transactions. A total of
52.9 percent of authorities report sometimes using
the forward market, perhaps in conjunction with
the spot market to create a swap transaction. No
authority reports always using the forward market.
Finally, one authority reports having used a futures
market to conduct intervention.
There is no clear pattern as to the method of
dealing with counterparties (question 5). Direct
dealing over the telephone is most popular, being
used sometimes or always by 100 percent of au-
thorities. Direct dealing over an electronic network
is used by 43.8 percent of authorities sometimes or
always. Live foreign exchange brokers are used
sometimes or always by 63.2 percent of the re-
spondents. Finally, electronic brokers such as EBS
are used by 12.5 percent of the authorities. There
6 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s response on this point is a mat-
ter of public record. See Deputy Governor Sherwin’s May 9, 2000,
speech to the World Bank Treasury at
<http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/speeches/0092115.html>. This link was
current as of April 20, 2001. The Appendix to this article provides
links to descriptions of foreign exchange markets and/or interven-














NOTE: The table identifies the 22 monetary authorities that
responded to the survey.
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Summary of Intervention Survey Responses
1. In the last decade, on approximately what percentage of business 
days has your monetary authority conducted intervention? 
2. Foreign exchange intervention changes the domestic monetary base.










Other (please specify in margin)
5. Intervention transactions are conducted by:
Direct dealing with counterparties via telephone
Direct dealing with counterparties via electronic communication
Live FX brokers 
Electronic brokers (e.g., EBS, Reuters 2002) 
6. The following strategies determine the amount of intervention:
A prespecified amount is traded 
Intervention size depends on market reaction to initial trades
7. Intervention is conducted at the following times of day:
Prior to normal business hours
Morning of the business day
Afternoon of the business day
After normal business hours
8. Is intervention sometimes conducted through indirect methods, 
such as changing the regulations regarding foreign exchange
exposure of banks? 
9. The following are factors in intervention decisions:
To resist short-term trends in exchange rates
To correct long-run misalignments of exchange rates from
fundamental values
To profit from speculative trades
Other
10. Intervention transactions are conducted secretly for the following 
reasons:
To maximize market impact
To minimize market impact
For portfolio adjustment 
Other
11. In your opinion, how long does it take to observe the full effect of 





More than a few days












































































































































NOTE: Question 1 shows the minimum, median, and maximum responses (from 0 to 100) on the percentage of days intervention was
conducted in the last decade. Questions 2 through 10 show the percentage of responses of “Never,”“Sometimes,”and “Always”to those
questions. Question 11 shows the percentage of responses indicating that the full effects of intervention were felt at each horizon.6 MAY/JUNE 2001
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was some evidence that responding institutions are
moving increasingly toward electronic methods,
along with other market participants. 
There has been very little research on factors
that determine the magnitude of intervention—
though reaction function research touches on this
issue—but the responses to question 6 indicate
that the size of interventions frequently depends
on market reaction to initial trades. Ninety-five
percent of monetary authorities report that mar-
ket reaction sometimes or always affects the size
of total trades. Because the size of the intervention
is endogenous to market reaction, determining
the interaction of intervention and exchange rate
changes at high frequencies might require careful
evaluation.7
Most intervention takes place during the busi-
ness day, but almost half the banks report that
they sometimes intervene prior to business hours
and more than half intervene after business
hours.8 For example, the Reserve Bank of
Australia publicly states that it is willing to inter-
vene outside of normal business hours (Rankin,
1998). Some after-hours intervention might be in
support of other authorities. About a quarter of
central banks report that they always intervene in
the business morning (14.3 percent) or business
afternoon (10 percent), however. 
In answering question 8, 23.8 percent of
authorities report sometimes intervening with
indirect methods. The authorities cite changing
banking regulations on foreign exchange expo-
sure and moral suasion as methods of indirect
intervention. Not surprisingly, indirect methods
seem to be used predominantly by central banks
without a long history of free capital movements
or a convertible currency. 
The Motivation for Intervention
The motivation for intervention decisions has
been widely researched and often discussed.
Research and official pronouncements support
the idea that monetary authorities with floating
exchange rates most often employ intervention
to resist short-run trends in exchange rates, the
leaning-against-the-wind hypothesis.9 Another
popular hypothesis is that intervention is used to
correct medium-term “misalignments” of exchange
rates away from “fundamental values.” Question 9
inquires about these possibilities. The responses
generally support these hypotheses with 89.5 per-
cent of monetary authorities sometimes or always
intervening to resist short-run trends and 66.7 per-
cent seeking to return exchange rates to “funda-
mental values.” Some countries specified “other”
reasons that might be interpreted as variations on
the leaning-against-the-wind or misalignment
hypotheses. Still other countries note macroeco-
nomic goals such as limiting exchange rate pass-
through to prices, defense of an exchange rate
target, or accumulating reserves as motivating
intervention. 
One hypothesis that has received some atten-
tion in the last few years is that profitability is a
consideration in intervention. A series of papers
have examined the profitability of intervention
(Leahy, 1995; Sweeney, 1997; Saacke, 1999), the
relationship between intervention profitability and
technical analysis (Neely, 1998, 2000), and
whether past profits influence intervention (Kim
and Sheen, 1999). While the early evidence
(Taylor, 1982b) indicated that central banks were
losing money on their intervention, the later
papers have been much more supportive of the
hypothesis that central banks have at least broken
even on floating rate intervention, with some evi-
dence that they have made large profits.10
The notion that profitability is a consideration
in intervention decisions is uniformly rejected,
however, by the survey respondents. Not one
respondent to question 9 reports that profitability
was ever a motivation for intervention. Despite
this, private conversations with individuals
involved in intervention decisions suggest that
profitability is a useful gauge of their success as
careful stewards of public resources. In addition,
the Reserve Bank of Australia argues that prof-
itability attests that its intervention has stabilized
the exchange rate (Rankin, 1998). This RBA claim
relies on Friedman’s (1953) claim that stabilizing
speculation is equivalent to profitable speculation.
If speculators consistently buy (sell) when the
asset price is below (above) its equilibrium value,
they will both tend to drive the asset price toward
7 The author thanks Lucio Sarno for pointing this out. 
8 Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) examine the affect of intervention
using high frequency data and the time of data. 
9 Indeed, the published statements of several central banks specifi-
cally cite the desire to counter trends in exchange rates as motivat-
ing intervention. See Board of Governors (1994, p. 64) or Rankin
(1998).
10 Sweeney (1997, 2000) argues that risk adjustment is crucial in
assessing profits or losses from official intervention.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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its equilibrium value and to profit from these
transactions.11 The link between profitability and
stabilizing speculation is tenuous, however. Salant
(1974), Mayer and Taguchi (1983), and De Long,
Schleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) pro-
vide counterexamples. 
The Role of Secrecy in Intervention
The role of secrecy in intervention is not well
understood. Most monetary authorities usually
chose to intervene secretly, releasing actual inter-
vention data with a lag, if at all. Some authorities,
the Swiss National Bank, for example, always
publicize interventions at the time they occur.
Does secret intervention maximize or minimize
the impact of the transaction? If authorities inter-
vene to convey information to markets, why do
they conceal these transactions? Dominguez and
Frankel (1993) recount several possibilities: When
fundamentals are inconsistent with intervention,
monetary authorities would prefer not to draw
attention to the intervention. Or, the monetary
authority might have poor credibility for sending
trustworthy signals. Or, the monetary authority
might wish to simply adjust the currency holdings
of its portfolio. Bhattacharya and Weller (1997)
provide another possible explanation for secrecy.
They present a model in which small amounts of
intervention reveal the authority’s information to
private parties, thus influencing exchange rates.
This secrecy issue has not been satisfactorily
resolved in the literature. 
Consistent with the confusion in the academic
literature, the answers to question 10 reflect dis-
agreement among the respondents about the pur-
pose of secrecy. More authorities report sometimes
or always intervening secretly to maximize mar-
ket impact (76.5 percent) than report sometimes
or always intervening secretly to minimize market
impact (57.1 percent). Such disagreement is sig-
nificant. No central bank cites portfolio adjustment
as a reason for secret intervention, contrary to the
reasonable conjecture of Dominguez and Frankel
(1993). Of course, the central banks might not
consider transactions for portfolio adjustment to
be intervention. 
The Horizon of Intervention Effects
Perhaps the most important question in the
literature on central bank intervention is whether
central bank intervention is effective in influenc-
ing the exchange rate. For many years, the biggest
hurdle to answering this question was the paucity
of data. More recently, even as more data have
become available, it is manifest that two barriers
to answering the question remain. First, what
would the exchange rate have been in the absence
of intervention? Second, over what horizon should
we measure the effectiveness of intervention and
how large and long-lasting an effect can be con-
sidered a success? 
The academic literature has been ambivalent
about the efficacy of official intervention in the
foreign exchange market. The Jurgensen Report
(Jurgensen, 1983) was pessimistic about the effects
of intervention. Dominguez and Frankel (1993)—
using then-recently released intervention data—
argued that intervention can work by changing
expectations of future exchange rates. Edison
(1993) concluded that, while the evidence might
be consistent with some short-run effect, there is
no evidence for a lasting effect from intervention.
Sarno and Taylor (2000), in contrast, conclude
that the recent consensus of the profession is that
intervention is effective through both the signal-
ing and portfolio balance channels. 
Despite skepticism on the part of academics,
central banks continue to intervene—though per-
haps less frequently than in the past—implying
that policymakers do think that intervention can be
an effective tool. Question 11 asks the monetary
authorities whether intervention has an effect on
exchange rates and, if so, over what horizon one
might see the full effect. All of the respondents indi-
cate that they think intervention has some effect
on exchange rates.12 Most of the respondents
believe in a relatively rapid response, over a few
minutes (38.9 percent) or a few hours (22.2 per-
cent). Still, a substantial minority think that inter-
vention’s full effect is seen over a few days (27.8
percent) or more (11.1 percent). The dispersion in
the survey is substantial, indicating almost as much
discord among central bankers as among academics. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article has examined the mechanics of
intervention—instruments, counterparties, timing,
11 Friedman (1953) was referring more generally to speculation in for-
eign exchange and discussed government speculation (intervention)
as a special case. 
12 Of course, having an effect on exchange rates at some horizon
might not imply that intervention is successful.8 MAY/JUNE 2001
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and amounts—as well as related issues like secre-
cy, motivation, and the perceived efficacy of such
transactions. A survey of monetary authorities’
intervention practices reveals that a number of
monetary authorities do intervene with some fre-
quency in foreign exchange (mostly spot) markets.
The desire to check short-run trends or correct
longer-term misalignments often motivates inter-
vention, whereas the size of intervention often
depends on market reaction to initial trades.
Although intervention typically takes place during
business hours, most monetary authorities will
also intervene outside of these hours, if necessary.
And, while there is unanimous agreement that
intervention does influence exchange rates, there
is much disagreement about the horizon over
which the full effect of this influence is felt, with
estimates ranging from a few minutes to more
than a few days. 
The topic of the practice of official interven-
tion is very broad. To simplify this study, issues
like coordinated versus unilateral intervention,
choice of intervention currency, and distinguish-
ing between intervention in fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes have been left for further
study. Other issues that merit further considera-
tion are motivations for secrecy and the metric for
judging the success of intervention.
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Notes on the pages
Excellent descriptive page on mar-
kets and intervention.
Foreign exchange policy.
Concise description of interven-
tion policy.
Description of foreign exchange
markets.
No work directly describing inter-
vention policy but speeches and
working papers may relate. 
1997 description of the ECB’s
responsibility in foreign exchange
intervention.
Speech by the CEO describing
exchange rate policy.
Outline of the Bank of Japan’s for-
eign exchange intervention 
operations.
Description of monetary and
exchange rate policies.
Some descriptions of intervention
in annual reports.
See the pamphlet, Economics
Explorer #1.
Describes South Africa’s use of
forward cover in somewhat tech-
nical terms. 
Some intervention descriptions in
annual reports.
Very brief description of current
exchange rate policy.
See page 64 for a very brief
description of intervention policy.
Appendix
Monetary Authority Web Pages Describing Intervention or Foreign Exchange Markets